the payment he must show that the order is genume, not m signature only, but in every n:ereci" , io OvET the years" nlbeit less so in connection v,rith consumer accounts, 11 the bank's absolute liability became subject to exceptions. Paiiicularly, bypassing a classical text explicitly to the contrary, 12 it had been recognized that a custo111er's fault can lead to the forgery of the customer's own signature and hence to forgery losses. The door was thus opened for a bank which paid over an unauthorized payment order to avoid liability not only where the customer had been aware of the unauthorized order 13 but also by invoking the customer's negligence in facilitating the issue of the unauthorized payment instructions. In the United States of America, 14 and subsequently in South Africa, 15 the bank's right is codified. In England 16 and Canada, 17 such a right must be provided by contract. 18 Accordingly, the rule was modified to make the bank's liability less absolute so as to be avoided where fault lay with the customer. It was thus said that '[i]f the bank pays money on a forged check, no matter under what circumstances of caution, or however honest the belief in its genuineness, if the depositor himself be free of blame, and has done nothing to mislead the bank, all the loss must be borne by the bank, for it acts at its peril, and pays out its own funds, and not those of the depositor'. 19 Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which a bank may seek to be released from liability for payment of unauthorized orders even where neither knowledge nor negligence can be attributed to the customer. Thus, in practice, a customer's payment order is transmitted to its 20 bank either by the delivery of a piece of paper or electronically. 21 Sender's authority is thus verified by the receiving bank2 2 with the view of authenticating the co111111unication either by 10 At 7 57 (BC); 282 (ER) (per Bayley J Montreal (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 (SCC). 18 Much of the discussion and even a resulting statutory provision (such as UCC 4-406 in the United States of America) on the customer's negligence addresses the specific obligation of examining and verifying banks' periodic statements and advising the bank of any discrepancy (including an unauthorized payment). The breach of such a duty may reduce the bank's chances of identifying and recovering from the wrongdoer and allow a repeating wrongdoer to issue future unauthorized orders. 19 Hardy v Chesapeake Bank (1879) 51 Md 562 *11 (per Alvey J). 20 Most business customers are incorporated. 21 In principle, communication may be oral, except that typically an oral communication is followed by either a signed written confinnation or a verification according to an agreed-upon 'security procedure' of the type discussed further below. 22 In the footsteps ofUCC s 4A-103, throughout this essay, the tern1s 'sender' and 'receiving bank' are the parties to a 'payment order' issued in the course ofa wire transfer. On UCC article 4A in the United States of America, see, generally, note 26 below.
the examination of the signature or according to a security procedure. A signature is individual to each person so that its verification confirms the identity of the signer. This is, of course, correct also in relation to a corporate customer which obligates itself by the signature of designated signatories whose signatures are on file with the bank. At the same time, the verification according to a security procedure serves as a legitimization of the communication without the identification of the individual sender who actually issued it.
In the absence of a manual signature, banks are unable to link a payment order with an individual who issued it. True, banks remain perceived as 'custodians of the customer's money' providing for 'a safe place of deposit' . 23 At the same time, where the identification of the issuer cannot be ascertained by the bank, the rationale for the bank's absolute liability for an unauthorized payment order, as stated above, becomes significantly weaker. Unsurprisingly then, American authorities dealing with negotiable instruments have given full effect to corporate resolutions authorizing the use of facsimile signatures to bind corporate entities. 24 This must be correct in England as wel!.
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Acting on a contractually agreed electronic authorization is in principle not different from acting on a facsimile signature affixed to a payment instrument on which the bank is authorized to act according to the customer agreement. In either case the bank is unable to associate the authorization with a particular person. Hence, the bank may similarly be justified in including in the customer agreement a tenn authorizing the bank to act on a payment order that was issued according to the agreed-upon security procedures. Effectively, such a tenn is designed to estop the corporate customer from pleading that the person who affixed the facsimile signature or inserted the card and used the right code was not authorized to do so.
For its part, however, a customer who followed the security procedure in issuing a payment order expects the procedure to be reliable and that the bank will properly verify as to whether it has been followed. In a sense, this lowers the bank's verification duty from being absolute to that of due care. Indeed, in the United States of America, prior to the adoption of article 4A of the Unifonn Commercial Code (UCC), 26 Walker v Texas Commerce Bank 27 stated that in acting on a payment order the receiving bank is under a duty to 'implement commercially reasonable internal procedures designed to process [a payment order] in accordance with [the sender's] instructions, to verify the accuracy of, and compliance with, instructions, to detect and minimize inaccuracy, and act diligently to remedy errors '. 28 This is in line with the receiving bank's 'duty to use reasonable care and skill' in carrying out instructions contained in a payment order, set out in England in Royal Products Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd.
29 Both such statements reflect a principle broad enough to cover the receiving bank's duties in carrying out the verification of the authenticity of the payment instructions.
In endeavouring to meet negligent customers' pleas designed to reallocate unauthorized h~ n l,-,_., n-1~:i·v
some cases, non-negligent banks may, however, wish to escape liability even where customers were not negligent. Such is the case, for example, where banks provided a reliable security procedure which they diligently followed. In tum, customers wish to remind banks that they are 'custodians of the customer's money' providing for 'a safe place of deposit' , 31 so as to leave banks liable, at least as long as no fault (or even no gross negligence) has been attributed to the customer.
Against the background of very little case law, it cannot be anticipated that under the common law a proper balance between the legitimate expectations of the bank and the customer will be established soon enough to satisfy certainty. Left to their own mischief, and without violating rules that preclude them from disclaiming their own due care obligations, 32 banks successfully managed to invoke contractual terms that allowed them to escape liability not only when the customer was negligent. Rather, such terms released banks also when they acted on a counterfeit facsimile signature placed on a cheque 33 or counterfeit wire instructions 34 as long as they were effectively acting without knowledge of the ingenuity, or at least without gross negligence. This was so even if the fraudster was a complete outsider to the customer's organization who accessed relevant information without any fault of the customer or someone in its organization. This, however, appears to go too far in overlooking banks' traditional role according to which they are perceived to be 'custodians of the customer's money' providing for 'a safe place of deposit' .
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Article 4A of the UCC contains an elaborate scheme of loss allocation for unauthorized wire transfers 36 which purports to achieve the right balance. 37 Briefly stated, under that scheme, the customer is liable to the receiving bank for the amount of any authorized payment order for which the customer is bound under the law of agency. The customer is also liable for the amount of any payment order, including an unauthorized one, whose authenticity was properly verified pursuant to a commercially reasonable security procedure agreed upon between the customer and the bank. However, such an unauthorized order does not bind the customer where it is otherwise agreed, or where the customer proves that the order was not caused by a person other than an interloper. Accordingly, the risk of an unauthorized payment order falls initially on the bank. Such risk shifts to the customer if the bank proves its good-faith compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure. The risk shifts back to the bank when the loss is proved by the customer to have been caused by an interloper or is allocated to the bank by agreement. This essay assesses the success of the UCC article 4A scheme in implementing a correct balance between the expectations of the bank and customers. It discusses the statutory provisions and their interpretation by case law. It concludes that, in the final analysis, the scheme under UCC article 4A is a great leap forward. At the same time, the essay calls for an 30 38 Authority can be given to the bank according to the tenns of an agreement previously entered into between the bank and customer. 39 This will typically be a framework agreement to govern future payment orders. Authority could, however, also be given to the bank by the customer on an ad hoc basis, in the absence of a preexisting agreement, and even contrary to the terms of such an agreement.
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It is, however, recognized that where transmission of the payment order is made electronically, which is the common case in the wire-transfer business, agency concepts are not sufficiently helpful to ascertain the sender's authority. The receiving bank which 'may be required to act on the basis of a message that appears on a computer screen' is relying on verification pursuant to a security procedure, and not on the authority of any particular person. 41 Indeed, a security procedure is not necessarily limited to a computerized enviromnent and might apply to a cmmnunication that is transmitted by telephone or in writing. 42 However, in connection with an electronic connnunication, it is not only that '[p ]rndent banking practice may require that security procedures be utilized' . 43 Rather, effectively, a security procedure in such a case is indispensable. In fact, to bypass security procedures in an electronic envirol1111ent, a receiving bank should have agreed with the customer as to what facts constitute authorization to the bank to act on payment orders purporting to be sent on the customer's behalf. Hence, a security procedure is predominantly used for the verification of an electronic connnunication. It is in this context that security procedures are discussed in this essay.
Verification is designed to link the payment order to its source so as to 'authenticate' it. Effectively, proof of verification pursuant to a security procedure is a step towards proving authority. 44 In fact, and without using any language to that effect, article 4A creates a rebuttable presumption that a properly verified payment order has been authorized. Presumption GEVA may, however, be rebutted only by the customer's proving a specified set of facts; customer's providing in subsections (h) and (c) for the elements to be proven by a bank wishing to benefit from the presumption, either where no authorization was given, or where there is a genuine factual issue as to its existence, 45 At the same time, from the same perspective, section 4A-203 can be seen as dealing with what is to be proved by a customer wishing to rebut the presumption.
Instead of referring to a presumption of authority, article 4A speaks, however, of the binding effect of a payment order that was proved to be verified pursuant to a security procedure, and, conversely, of its unenforceability, if certain facts are nonetheless proved by the customer. Accordingly, the risk of an unauthorized payment order falls initially on the bank. Such risk shifts to the customer if the bank proves its good-faith compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure. The risk shifts back to the bank when the loss is proved by the customer to have been caused by an interloper or is allocated to the bank by agreement.
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VERIFICATION ACCORDING TO AGREED SECURITY PROCEDURE
Under section 4A-201, a 'security procedure' must be established by agreement between a customer and a receiving bank. 'The term does not apply to procedures that the receiving bank may follow unilaterally in processing payment orders' . 47 The pertinent agreement ought to be established for the purpose of 'verifying that a payment order or communication amending or cancelling, a payment order is that of the customer. ' 48 To the same end, under section 4A-202(b), effective verification requires an agreement between the bank and the customer 'that the authenticity of payment orders issued to the bank in the name of the customer as sender will be verified pursuant to a security procedure'.
The agreement providing for the security procedures need not be express or in writing; it could be oral or even implied from a course of dealing. 49 For evidentiary purposes, however, it may be more efficient for a bank to reduce such an agreement to writing. A written agreement is nevertheless needed where the customer refuses a security procedure offered by the bank and chooses its own, and the bank wishes to benefit from the presumption under section 4A-202(c) as to the commercial reasonableness of the security procedure chosen by the customer. Typically, such a written agreement will bind the customer to any payment order whose 45 authenticity was verified by the bank in good faith and pursuant to the inferior security procedure chosen by the customer.
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From the customer's viewpoint, under section 4A-203(a)(l), an express written agreement is required to have the risk of an unauthorized payment order shifted back to the bank, notwithstanding the use of the commercially reasonable security procedure. In addition, a written agreement or instruction of the customer is required to impose restrictions on the use of security procedures with respect to the acceptance of designated payment orders under section 4A-202(b).
Where a customer 'expressly agreed to the use of security passcodes ... and it agreed by course of performance to the use of challenge questions, having cooperated in setting up answers to such question', the court held that 'there [was] no genuine dispute that it agreed to the core security procedures visible to users'. 51 It was also held that a security procedure chosen unilaterally by the bank pursuant to the customer's authorization is established by agreement.
52 As well, 'agreement' may be evidenced by the customer's lmowledge that the bank uses the procedure to verify payment orders and is not breached by the bank by merely unilaterally changing the procedure name.
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There are precedents allowing the bank to rely on the customer's agreement and acknowledgement of the commercial reasonableness of the 'security procedure' . 54 Arguably, however, such an agreement is, contrary to section 4A-202(f), an invalid waiver by the customer of its rights under section 4A-202. Thereunder, liability for unauthorized payment orders is limited only to those properly verified according to what the court views, rather than what the customer concedes to be, a 'coll1lllercially reasonable' security procedure.
Where a valid agreement exists, under section 4A-202(b), a payment order received by the bank is effective as the order of the customer, whether or not authorized, where it was accepted by the bank in good faith and upon compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure. App 2012) , where the court determined only the existence of an agreement. However, the chance is that in the facts of the case the security procedure (consisting oflogging in using the company ID and a user ID with each user having a specific 'digital certificate') was in any event commercially reasonable.
security procedure' . 56 Mere voice recognition is not, by itself, a security procedure. Nevertheelement of an otherwise computerized effective security procedure.
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Under section 4A-202(c), commercial reasonableness ofa security procedure is a guestlon of law. As explained in Comment 4 to section 4A-203: 'It is appropriate to make the finding concerning commercial reasonability a matter of law because security procedures are likely to be standardized in the banking industry and a question of law standard leads to more predictability concerning the level of security that a bank must offer to its customers.'
In determining the commercial reasonableness of a security procedure, consideration will be given to 'the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer lmown to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the customer, and security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated' . 58 Taking into account that ' [ v ]erification entails labor and equipment costs that can vary greatly depending upon the degree of security that is sought', Comment 4 to section 4A-203 states:
'A security procedure is not commercially unreasonable simply because another procedure might have been better or because the judge ... would have opted for a more stringent procedure. The standard is not whether the security procedure is the best available. Rather it is whether the procedure is reasonable for the particular customer and the particular bank, which is a lower standard. On the other hand, a security procedure that fails to meet prevailing standards of good banking practice applicable to the particular bank should not be held to be commercially reasonable. ' While whether a particular security procedure is 'commercially reasonable' is a question of law, compliance by the receiving bank with the procedure is, in each case, a question of fact.59
Where the customer rejects a commercially reasonable security procedure offered by the bank in favour of a security procedure of its own choice, the offering bank may benefit from a presmnption of commercial reasonableness attributed to the security procedure selected by the customer. Thus, under section 4A-202(c):
'A security procedure is deemed to be commercially reasonable if (i) the security procedure was chosen by the customer after the bank offered, and the customer refused, a security procedure that was commercially reasonable for that customer, and (ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in compliance with the security procedure chosen by the customer. ' This recognizes that an informed customer may refuse a commercially reasonable security procedure offered by the bank and insist on using a higher risk and more convenient or cheaper procedure. In such a case, the loss from an unauthorized but properly verified payment order is not shifted to the bank, even if the security procedure chosen by the customer does not meet the commercial reasonableness standard. 60 Nonetheless, to be protected from 56 the failure of a security procedure chosen by the customer, the bank must have originally offered the customer a commercially reasonable security procedure.
In Choice Escrow and Land Title v BankcorpSouth,
61 'on two different occasions' the customer 'was offered the opportunity to employ 'Dual Control' 62 in sending payment orders. Such procedure required that each electronic wire transfer be initiated by two individuals acting on behalf of the customer, each having a distinct ID and acting separately. Fearing that reliance on the need to constantly have two authorized employees present in the office would prove costly, the customer declined and selected a system that by itself was conunercially reasonable and yet did not prevent a hacker from diverting funds overseas. Recognizing that '[t]he tension in modern society between security and convenience is on full display in this litigation', 63 the court nevertheless found that in any event two authorized employees were in the office at the same time. Thus effectively taking into account 'circumstances of the customer known to the bank' as required under section 4A-202(b), the comi held that the 'Dual Control' procedure was commercially reasonable.
To benefit from the protection under section 4A-202(b) for an unauthorized but verified payment order, the bank must prove 64 that it accepted the payment order in good faith, that it complied with the commercially reasonable security procedure, 65 and that it accepted the payment order 'in compliance with ... any written agreement or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer' . 66 However, the bank is not required to follow an instruction that violates a written agreement with the customer or notice of which is not received at a time and in a manner affording the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it before the payment order is accepted. 67 Under section 4A-105(a)(6), 'good faith' connotes honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. While the first prong-'honesty in fact'-is subjective, the second prong-'the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing'-is objective. 68 Particularly as to the latter, it is not all that clear what the bank has to show in order to prove that in accepting a payment order it acted in good faith. 69 70 that the acceptance by a receiving bank of instructions to pay to unusual destinations and at an accelerated frequency indicated a breach of this condition. Initially, in finding a genuine issue of material fact with respect to that point, the court did not elaborate on the knowledge requirement for the receiving bank, particularly in the context of a mechanical operation such as the issue of payment orders verified according to agreed-upon security procedures. Ultimately, however, the trier of fact ~he 2.rg 1 J. 71 In the absence of evidence presented by the receiving bank conveying the commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing, 72 he was thus 'inclined to find that a bank dealing fairly with its customer ... would have detected and/or stopped the fraudulent wire activity earlier'.
It was argued in Experi-Metal Inc v Comerica Bank
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LOSS ALLOCATION UNDER THE STATUTE Under section 4A-202(b), 'a payment order ... is effective as the order of the customer, whether or not authorized', if it is verified pursuant to the agreed-upon security procedure. The effect of this provision is to place the risk of loss on the customer if an unauthorized payment order is accepted by the receiving bank after verification by the bank in compliance with a commercially reasonable security procedure. 74 Section 4A-203 provides for two exceptions. The first reflects the limits to the rationale of section 4A-202(b). The second recognizes the parties' power to contract out of some provisions of article 4A. Thus, underlying the customer's responsibility for an unauthorized but verified payment order is the assumption that information on the security procedure facilitating compliance and successful verification is likely to have been made available to the wrongdoer by the customer. To that end, section 4A-203(a)(2) effectively places on the customer an obligation to safeguard confidential security infonnation to prevent breaches of the agreed-upon security procedures. 75 Under that provision, the customer may avoid the loss resulting from payment of an unauthorized but verified payment order by proving that neither breach of trust nor a leak occurred at its end. This means that the customer is not responsible for the amount of the payment order if it proves that-' ... the order was not caused, directly or indirectly, by a person (i) entrusted at any time with duties to act for the customer with respect to payment orders or the security procedure, or (ii) who obtained access to transmitting facilities of the customer or who obtained, from a source controlled by the customer and without authority of the receiving bank, information facilitating breach of the security procedure, regardless of how the information was obtained or whether the customer was at fault. Information includes any access device, computer software, or the like. ' The customer must then prove that the order was not caused by a person other than an interloper. 76 Evidence needed by the customer in order to meet the required burden of proof 77 is likely to be generated by the criminal and internal investigations conducted in the aftermath of the breach of security. Section 4A-203(a)(l) provides for a second exception to the customer's responsibility for an unauthorized but properly verified payment order. The loss resulting from such a payment may be shifted, in whole or in part, to the receiving bank by express written agreement between the bank and the customer.
In attempting to shift to its bank losses caused by unauthorized but properly verified payment orders, a customer may however encounter several difficulties.
In the first instance, banks are unlikely to expressly agree in writing to assume this risk, as mandated by the second exception.
Secondly, a few statutory limitations and ambiguities exist in the quoted language of section 4A-203(a)(2), providing for the first exception. (a) It is true that, under clause (i), it is not loss caused by any employee of the customer that appears to fasten liability on the customer; rather, it must be loss caused by a 'person ... entrusted at any time with duties to act for the customer with respect to payment orders or the security procedure'. At the same time, however, under clause (ii), the customer is also bound by loss caused by any 'person ... who obtained access to transmitting facilities of the customer'. Thus, having 'obtained access to transmitting facilities of the customer', an employee not covered by clause (i) may nevertheless fall under clause (ii). (b) Regardless, is the 'obtained access to transmitting facilities' in clause (ii) (which precludes the customer from avoiding liability) limited to physical access, or rather, does it cover also 'virtual' access from a remote terminal or computer? Official Comment 5 to section 4A-203 speaks of 'access to transmitting facilities through an access device or other software', which supports the 'virtual' access interpretation. 79 Whether access must be given by the customer voluntarily, so that at least in the absence of fault by the customer, a hacker will not be a person covered by clause (ii), may be an open question. 80 Even if the customer's responsibility is limited to cases where access is voluntarily given, there may be circumstances under which 'access' is fraudulently induced, negligently given, or inadvertently surrendered for purposes other than the dispatch of a payment order purportedly by the customer. What is required under clause (ii) is causation by either the obtaimnent of access to the customer's transmitting facilities, or the obtainment from a source controlled by the customer (and without the receiving bank's authority) ofinfonnation facilitating a breach of the security procedure. Fault of the customer is said not to be a factor only with respect to the second prong, that of the obtainment of information and not the obtainment to access to facilities. However, there is no reason to suppose that the obtainment of access to the customer's facility by fraudulently inducing the customer or taking advantage of the customer's negligence will excuse the customer. (c) Clause (ii) allocates responsibility to the customer for a payment order caused by a person 'who obtained, from a source controlled by the customer and without authority of the receiving bank, information facilitating breach of the security procedure, regardless of how the infonnation was obtained or whether the customer was at fault'. Information is broadly defined to include 'any access device, computer software, or the like'. This seems to fasten responsibility to the customer only where loss caused by information originated in an area under its control. But how far does the customer's control extend? What about access obtained, or infonnation received, from a third-party communi- a system 'is deemed to be an agent of the sender'. As such, does the system become 'a source controlled by the customer', and its transmitting facilities become those 'of the customer', so as to make the customer responsible for losses caused by breach of security in such a system? Such a conclusion is not inevitable and in my view ought to be rejected; agency under section 4A-206 is to be limited to the terms of a payment order actually transmitted by the customer through the system. Nevertheless, this view may not be universally shared and the question remams open.
Thirdly, allocation of losses caused by verified unauthorized orders under article 4A is asymmetric. Under section 4A-202, the bank avoids liability by proving compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure and other contracts. Conversely, to shift liability back to the bank, and in the absence of (an unlikely) contract to the contrary, the customer is required to prove under section 4A-203, that the payment order was not caused 'directly or indirectly' by a breach of security at its own end. The latter set of facts is much harder to prove than compliance with the security procedure. Certainly, the customer will not avoid liability by merely proving due diligence or compliance with commercially reasonable standards in controlling both access to its transmittal facilities and infonnation held by a source controlled by it. Furthermore, as will be shown below, according to Patco Constr v People's United Bank, 81 in principle, even where the bank's security procedure is not found to be commercially reasonable, a customer may be found to be in breach of a duty to the bank and thus bear the loss. It was even argued in the court below in that case that a commercially reasonable agreed-upon security procedure unintentionally weakened by the addition to it by the bank of new elements (that effectively compromised the elements agreed upon) remains commercially reasonable. Unless such practice undermines the good-faith compliance with the agreed security procedure, there may not be a way for the customer to introduce this aspect into the 'equation'. 82 However, as discussed below, the Court of Appeal ultimately declined to find the security procedure, together with the additional elements, to be commercially reasonable.
In Elite Investigations v Bank of New York, 83 Elite's payment orders were to be issued by inputting, through a third-party communication system, 84 the security code that appeared on a credit card of the company president, together with the president's social security number and date of birth. This must be taken to form a 'security procedure' the commercial reasonableness of which was not questioned by the court. A fraudulent Elite employee, who had been removed from the signature card of the company as a result of an earlier fraud, but who nevertheless remained authorized to review its bank and charge-card statements, and who was entrusted with a corporate charge card, initiated electronic funds transfers under the president's name and misappropriated the funds for his own personal use. 85 Elite sought to challenge the debits to its bank account on the basis of alleged bank's duties to ensure that the 81 Supra note 51 (2012) 84 In the facts of the case, the third-party communication system consisted of American Express and the bank it used. For a communication system as an agent of the sender, sees 4A-206. In the facts of the case, each payment order initiated an ACH payment that the Court assumed to be governed by art 4A. 85 The consequences of the corporate customer's failure to give a timely notice of the contested debits, caused in the facts of the case by the involvement of the fraud instigator in the review of the bank statement, would have been a matter governed bys 4A-204. The provision is, however, limited to unauthorized or unverified payment orders in respect of which the bank is liable in the first place.
fraudulent employee had no access to its account as he had been removed from the signatory card. Concluding that the bank had no practical way of detem1ining who initiated the funds transfers and whether the payment orders were authorized, the court summarily dismissed the action.
In fact, the relevant issue was not whether the payment orders were authorized, but rather whether the corporate customer could overcome the bank's reliance on verification pmsuant to a commercially reasonable security procedure. In the facts of the case, it is unlikely that the corporate customer could have proven that the payment orders were not caused other than by an interloper in the sense of section 4A-203(a)(2). Thus, the action may have correctly been summarily dismissed, though for the wrong reasons.
PATCO CONSTRUCTION V PEOPLE'S UNITED BANK EXAMINED Patco Construction v People's United Bank
86 explored major issues in the interpretation of section 4A-202(b) and the resulting loss allocation under it. 87 In this case, in dealing with the reasonableness of an agreed security procedure, reliance was put 88 While not endorsing any particular technology for high-risk transactions (such as funds transfers to third parties), the Guidance disfavoured a single-factor authentication and favoured the implementation by financial institutions of 'multifactor authentication, layered security, or other controls reasonably calculated to mitigate ... risks'.
In the facts of the case, the customer ' ... agreed to the core security procedures visible to users that comprised the key components of the integrated security package used by the Bank.
[It] expressly agreed to the use of security passcodes, which consisted of a customer ID and customer password and a user ID and user password for each authorized user of the customer, ... and it agreed by course of performance to the use of challenge questions, having cooperated in setting up answers to such questions and having answered them in the course of conducting eB anking.'
It also 'effectively agreed to monitor its commercial accounts daily'. 89 The agreed security procedure was strengthened by invisible elements such as risk profiling for the customer, device cookies placed onto customers' computers to identify particular computers used to access online banking, and subscription to eFraud Network. monitoring the account activity daily. With no response from the customer, the bank kept executing the payment orders, as neither incorrect password nor incorrect answer to a challenge question was submitted by the initiator
In challenging the conunercial reasonableness of the security procedure, the customer argued that the authentication procedure did not truly consist of 'layered security.' Thus, while authentication required both codes and answers to challenge questions, the effect of each stage in which enhanced risk was perceived was to trigger more challenge questions. In addition, the customer argued that over time the increased frequency with which challenge questions had been asked did not enhance security but increased risk by giving hackers greater opportunity to find out the correct answers to them. The District Court rejected these arguments and found that the authentication procedure truly consisted of 'layered security.' It held that overall, even though it was not optimal, the security procedure certainly met the conunercially reasonable standard. Pointing out that in the wake of the transfers the customer failed to isolate its computer or forensically preserve the hard drives, the district court concluded that a security breach could have occurred only at the customer's end. It gave a summary judgment in the bank's favour.
It is obvious that the District Court in Patco interpreted 'access to transmitting facilities of the customer' in section 4A-203(a)(2) as including virtual access by a hacker. The case was thus resolved solely on the basis of the bank's good-faith compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure, because the customer was unable to prove that its system had not been the source from which the hacker had obtained the information. True, the customer was not free of negligence and yet, according to the District Court, its existence or absence played no role in the final outcome.
The United States Court of Appeal of the First Circuit reversed the decision. 91 It first pointed out that '[a]lthough the bank's security system flagged each of these transactions as unusually "high-risk" because they were inconsistent with the timing, value, and geographic location of Patco's regular payment orders, the bank's security system did not notify its commercial customers' . 92 Specifically overruling the District Court on the effect of the increased frequency with which challenge questions had been asked and citing 'Article 4A's mandate that security procedures take into account "the circumstances of the customer" known to the bank', 93 the Court of Appeal was of the view that ' [The bank] did substantially increase the risk of fraud by asking for security answers for every SI transaction, particularly for customers like Patco which had frequent, regular, and high dollar transfers. Then, when it had warning that such fraud was likely occurring in a given transaction, [the bank] neither monitored that transaction nor provided notice to customers before allowing the transaction to be completed. Because it had the capacity to do all of those things, yet failed to do so, we cannot conclude that its security system was commercially reasonable. We emphasize that it was these collective failures taken as a whole, rather than any single failure, which rendered [the bank]'s security system commercially unreasonable. ' In the final analysis, in attempting to provide for a fair balance between banks and customers in the allocation of unauthorized and yet properly verified wire payment order losses, the scheme under article 4A is a great leap fonvard. However, statutory language must be improved and courts' awareness of pertinent policy considerations increased. This is not only in order to eliminate a few uncertainties 100 but also to fine-tune the overall loss allocation scheme so as to establish a better balance between the legitimate expectations and interests of relevant parties.
